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After the auto accident, the
claimant, z fr:rîL ï3-year old Missoula
woman, spent the last two months
of her life in the hospital intensive
care unit incurring over $250,000 in
medical expenses before her death.
She was entitled to Medicare bene-
frts and had pur-
chased a Medi-
care supplemen-
tal policy. She
was arÌ insured
under Medical
Pay coverage in
the car in which
she rode, }l'ex car
and that of her daughter with whom
she lived. Her driver carried moder-
ate limits of liability insurance, and
her daughter's policy contained un-
derinsured motorist coverage. Un-
fornrnatel¡ it is still likely that medi-
cal expenses will exhaust ail avail.-
able insurance coverage.
Counsel representing such
claimants know that securing pay-
ment of medical expenses in their
cases is a complex task that requires
one to know the policies, statutes,
and state and federal case decisions
that expand or limit the insurance
consumer's rights. In this column, I
will explore some of the law thatwill
control issues encountered as coun-
sel pursues payment of medical ex-
penses under insurance policies and
pfografns.
Medical Pay Coverage
Medical Pay'Coverage in ca-
sualty policies, i.e., personal auto,
homeowners, and commetcial gen-
eral liability policies, provides medi-
cal pay benefits to a person who is
entitled by reason of being an
"insured" under the policy. For ex-
ample, auto policies generally pay
reasonable medical and funeral ex-
penses caused by accident and sus-
tained by an "insured" within three
years of the date of the accident.
Under auto coverage, an "insured"
likely includes the named insured
md any frruly member living in the
same household while occupying a
motor vehicle or while being struck
by one as a pedestrian. An "insured"
also includes "any other person"
while "occupytfl€' the insured auto.'
,A.s in Evelyn's case, counsel should
pay attention to living affarigements
which may cause a person to be an
"insured" under someone else's pol-
icy. For example, because of the
prevalence of joint custody affaflge-
ments today, a minor child injured in
aî auto accident mly be arl
"insured" under each and every
medical pay policy coverage held by
zny pzreflt or grandparent with
whom the child lives even part time.
Also, in Farrzers Alliance MuL
Ins. Co. u. Ho/emøn,2 Judge Shanstrom
used Montana's consumer-friendly
"teasonable connection" test to de-
termine whether a passenger was
"occupying" a motor vehicle for
purposes of being deemed ?n
"insured" entitled to medical pay
benefits. In Holeman, the claimant,
Iæonard, was standing outside and
away from the insured pickup truck
when he was killed by an approach-
ing motor vehicle. His act of stand-
ing guatd while waiting for emer-
gency help was deemed z
"reasonable connection" that meant
he was "occupying" the vehicle. In
Ne/son u. Iowa MuÍ. Ins. C0.,3 the court
found the word "occupying¡'and its
policy definition "in or upon or en-
tering into or alighting from" to be
ambiguous. There, Nora Rennie
died of frostbite and exposure 143
feet from her stuck car while at-
tempting to fìnd heþ. The court
applied the reasonable connection
test to fìnd the deceased was
"occupying" the
vehicle at the time
of death. When
analyzing cover-
zge., counsel
should think of
the medical pay
coverage on the
auto policy as ap-
plying to ariyone with a "reasonable
connection" with the car.
Under a homeowner's policy,
medical pay coverage will generally
exclude from coverage the named
insured and regular members of the
household. Instead, coverage applies
to others injured at the "insured
location," or as a" result of activities
on the '"insured location," or caused
by "^ arrjmal owned by or in the
czte of an insured."*
Invariabl¡ any casualty policy
contains "other insurance" clauses
which seek to coordinate benefits.
These clauses may provide that, íf
there is other medical pay insurance
applicable to the irirry the subject
policy either shares pro-rzta, accord-
ing to limits of the policy or is
deemed excess and thereby aväable
only if the other policy is exhausted
by medical payments. If nvo medical
payment coverages each contain
"excess" insutance clauses, coufts
deem them mutually repugnant, and
the policies pây on a prc ntabasis.
However, in the Maine czse of Carri-
ers Ins. Co. a. Anericøn Poliryhollers'
Ins. Co.,n the court, in a well-
reasoned opinion, adopted the mi-
nority position that each policy, re-
gardless of limits, shares equally in
the loss up to the limit of the lowest
...counsel should think of the medical pay coverage
on the auto policy as applying to anyone with a
t'reasonable connection" with the car.
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policy after which the policy with
the highet limit covers the remaining
loss.
The Subrogation Problem
Subroption is a device in eq-
uity designed to cornpel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in
justice, equity, and good conscience
should pay.' Subrogaúon may be
classified as legl, arising by opera-
tion of law be-
cause the insurer
has made a pzy'
ment, of con-
ventional, aris-
ing under con-
ttact between
the parties.u Re-
gardless of
whether the insuter's subrogation is
classified as legal or conventional,
the Montana Supreme Court, in
Skauge stated the theory undedying
the insurer's right:
The theory behind this princi-
ple is that absent repayment
of the insurer the insured
would be unjustly enriched
by virnre of recovery from
both the insurer and the
wrongdoer, ot in absence of
such double recovety by the
insured, the third paty would
go free despite his legal obli-
gation in 
.connection with
loss.o
FIence, the motal impera-
tive behind insurance subroga-
tion is to prevent situations
where: (1) the plaintiff makes a
double recovery, or (2) the
wrongdoer goes free. The corol-
lary is that insurance subrogation
clauses should not apply if (1)
the plaintiff makes rìo double
recovery, or (2) makes the
wrongdoer pay the damages.
Invaúably, casualty insur-
ance policies contain subrogation
clauses which, in standard form,
Ínay âppeff as follows:
Our Right to Recover Pay-
ment _
In practice, the problem is that the insurer's subrogation
can result in the insurer being made whole while its
insured has only recovered a fraction of her damages.
A. If we makea paymentunder
this policy and the person to
or for whom payment was
made h¿s a right to tecover
damages from another we
shall be subrogated to that
right. That person shall do:
1. Whatever is necessary to
enable us to exercise our
rights;
2. Nothing after loss to preju-
dice them.
B. If we make payment under
this policy and the person to
or for whom payment is
made tecovers damages ftom
another, that person shall:
1. Hold in trust for us the
proceeds of the recovery;
2. Reimburse us to the extent
of our pâyment.
Note that this language is con-
sistent with the theory of subroga.-
tion but does not expressly contern-
plate those situations where there
has been no double or duplicate
recoverry ot where the wrongdoer
has been made to pay.
The insurer's rights of subro-
gation can be triggered by payment
of benefits to the insured under any
policy coverage. F{ence, under stan-
dard policy language, if the insurer
pays medical benefits under medical
pay coverage, it is entitled to be
reimbursed to the extent of its pay-
ment in the event that the insured
makes a cla:mt against any third party
responsible. The insurer is only enti-
tled to recover under subroption
the amount it has actually paid.'
While the insurer's imperative
is to prevent unjust enrichment by
double recovetJ or "duplicate pay-
ments for the same element of
loss,"to the problem for the plain-
tiffs lawyer is to prevent the insurer
from subrogatlng where there has
been no double recovery or dupli-
cate pâyment by the injured plin:úff.
In practice, the problem is that the
insurer's subroga.tion can result in
the insurer being made whole while
its insured has only recovered a frac-
tion of her damages. This occurs
when both the rn-
jured claimant and
her insurer are vy-
ing for the same
pool of money,
i.e., the $/rong-
doer's insurance
or assets, m an ef-
fort to satisfy their
right to compensation. For example,
in 1975, the Montana Supreme
Court held that either the partially
subroga.ted insurer, the partially paid
insured, or both may bnng the ac-
tion against the tortfeasor. Conflict
between the insureds' rights to re-
cover under tort law and the broad
rights of subrogation the insurers
accotded themselves in the policies
was inevitable.
Flowever, in the landmark
case of Skauge u. Moantain Suns Tel.
dv Te/. Co.,t' the court placed limits
on insurance subrogation to resolve
the conflict in a manner harmonious
with the underlying theory. The
Skauges suffered ffI1',267.32 n per-
sonal property darnage and inciden-
tal living expense when their rental
home exploded and bumed. Unigard
Insurance provided them personal
properry coverage with $4,000 limits
and incidental living expense with
$400 limits each of which Unigard
paid. To recover their unpaid losses,
Skauges pressed their tott claims
against Montana Dakota Uttlities
(I\{DU) ailegrng the company was
responsible for the explosion and
fire. Unigard filed a third party com-
plaint claiming reimbursemerit by
right of subrogation against any
amount to be paid by MDU to the
mtiln
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Skauges. The court realized the im-
port of ganting Unigard its broad
right of subrogation: the Skauges
might receive the amount of their
loss, $1-1-,267.32 ftori, MDU, from
which Unigard would take $4,400,
and the Skauges would have to pay
their own contingent attomey fees
and costs of litigation from the bal-
ance. In the end, the insuter, which
collected premiums to cover the
risk, would have
been firlly reim-
bursed for the
risk, and the in-
sureds would
have only netted
a small part of
their loss. The
court avoided
that result by holding that the in-
surer was not entitled to exercise a
right of subroga.tion until the in-
sured has been made whole includ-
ing expen-ses of litigation and attor-
ney fees.'' The court reasoned that,
if a party must bear the loss, it
should be the insurer, since that is
the risk the insured paid the insurer
14 ^,to assume.'- The court expressly
noted that, under its ruling, the
Skauges would not be unjustly en-
riched nor would the tortfeasor go
free from its legal obligation so that
the decision honored the theory of
insurance subrogation.tt This 
-rule
has become known as the "Make-
Whole" rule.
In \994, the court followed
Skauge when deciding Detienr¿e Assoc.
u. Farners [Jnion Møt. Ins. Co.tu
There, Detienne Associates, the
owners of the Park Plaza Hotel in
downtown FIelena, suffered several
hundred thousand dollars in loss
when a Montana Rail Link (À4RL)
train wreck caused loss of pou/er
and heat at the hotel during severe
cold weather which resulted in
breaks in the plumbing and water
loss to the facility. Farmers Union
paid Detienne $4LL,155.49 which
was less than their loss and then
sought to be reimbursed from any
amount Detienne secured in its
tort action against MRL. On the
same principles set out in Skauge,
the court held that the insurer had
to pay the insured's attorney fees
and costs, before it could proceed
to recover under its subrogation
claim. Aguitr, the court reiterated
that the insured must be made whole
including costs and attomey fees
before the insurer can subrogate,
The court reasoned that, if 
^ 
plfty must bear
the loss, it should be the insurer, since that is
the risk the insured paid the insurer to assume.
and, as between insurer and insured,
the insurer must bear the risk th¿t
there will not be enough recovery to
make both the insured and insurer
whole.
This "Made-Whole" rule has
also been used in Frøncetich u. Sture
Comþ. MuL Ins. Fønd17 and. Connery
u. Libertlt Nortbue¡t In¡. Co.tt lo
void insurance subrogation
statutes giving workers' compensa-
tion insurers a percentage offset
against benefits pzyable if the in-jured worker pressed a claim
against any third party. The court's
exptessed basis for voiding those
statutes that infringed the Made-
Whole rule was that they violated
the Full Legal Redress provision
of Article II S 16 of the Montana
Constitution.
In 1981,, n All¡un Ins. Co. a.
Reitler,tn the court prohibited subro-
gation by auto insurers to recover
amounts paid under medical pay
coverage citing three public policy
grounds. First, the insuted pud a
premium for the medical pay cover-
age. Second, the injured insured was
the parry most likely to suffer if the
medical pay benef,rt had to be reim-
bursed out of the recovery from the
tortfeasor. Third, the toftfeasor's in-
surer could take the fact of the medi-
cd, pay benefit received into account
in setrling with the claimant.2o The
court also held subrogation for ben-
efits paid under medicil puy cover-
zge acÃrally constituted an imper-
missible assignment of a personal
injury chose in action, but later repu-
diated that ground as being incorrect
trt Younpbbod a, American States Ins.
Co."t Lhie prohibition against subro-
gation was limited to benefits under
medical pay cover-
age, since, thrée
years lzter, in
Fanaers In¡. Exch.
u. Christenson,z the
court upheld an
insurer's subroga.-
tion to recover
amounts paid un-
der Uninsured Motorist Coverage.
For the next 1,6 years following Rr-
itler, itwas accepted in Montana that
auto insurers could not subrogate to
recover benefits they paid under
auto medical pay cove^r^age.
In Youngb/nod,z3 the court
sought to clarify that the Reitler deci-
sion on medical pay subrogation and
the Chri¡nnsoz decision on uninsured
motorist subroga.tion were not mat-
ters of assignment, but of subroga-
tion. The couft reaffirmed that in-
surer subrogation to secure reim-
bursement of medical expenses was
against public policy on the three
grounds cited above ftom Reitler.
Importantly, the court refused the
insurer's argument that the medi-
cal pzy subrogation clause was
validated by the then-existing pro-
vision from what Montana lawyers
call the "anti-stacking" statute
which then provided:
A motor vehicle liability pol-
icy may also provide for other
teasonable limitations, exclu-
sions, or reduction of cover-
age which are desþed to
prevent duplicate payments
for the same element of loss.za
The court was not convinced
that the provision covered subroga-
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tion as a limitation, exclusion, or
reduction and said that the legisla-
ture could have easily included it.
In response, the legislature
amended the clause in 1,997
adding subrogation into it so that
it reads as follows:
A motor vehicle liability pol-
rcy rrray also provide for other
re¿sonable limitations, exclu-
sions, reduc-
tions of cov-
etage, of
subrogation
clauses that
are desþed
to pfevent
duplicate
payments for
the same element of loss un-
der the motor vehicle liabiliry
policy or under another casu-
alty policy that provides cov-
erzge for an injury that neces-
sitates damages or benefit
payments or to prevent the
adding together of insurance
coverage limits in one policy
or from more than one policy
issued by the sãne com-
25pafry.
After the statute was
amended, insurers immediately as-
serted their right to press subroga.-
tion claims to recover benefits ex-
tended under automobile medical
pay coverage. Apparently, some
even assert that this amendment in
some way overtumed rhe Skauge and
Detienne rule that the insurer may
oniy subroga.te after the insured is
made whole including attomey fees
and costs.
However, review of the leg-
islative history of this amendment
from Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings on Senate BtIl 266 rcveal
that proponents expressed a univer-
sal concem about preventing dupli-
cate payments for the same element
of loss, some concem for making
sure that the wrongdoer pays, and
no conrnent regatding the de in
Skøuge or. Detienne.2u Consequently,
we should be clear that the amended
statute does nothing more than state
rhat an insurer may include in a
policy "subroga.tion clauses desþed
to prevent duplicate payments for
the same element of loss." This is
consistent with the theoreúcal basis
for insurance subrogation origi-
nally stated in Skauge but neither
expressly nor impliedly infringes
the rule that such subrogation can-
not take place until the insured is
made whole for loss, attorney fees,
and costs of litigation.
One could argte rhat there is
nothing inherently ,¡nfak about
making each insurer who collected a
premium on a promise to pay the
insured's medical expense, pay them,
even if the insured receives duplicate
payments. Indeed, the court in R/-
irler'1 and n Younþtoolt allrrd"d to
that point. Nevertheless, the overar-
ching principle that underlies all of
insurance subrogation, whether
granted by the court or by the legis-
lature under this statute, is its pur-
pose (1) to prevent duplicate pay-
ment for the same element of loss,
and Q) not to grant the insurer
subroga.tion rights that leave the in-
sured less than whole.
Counsel should also keep in
mind court-imposed restrictions on
parties against whom the insurer can
subrogate. Given the fact that insur-
ers like State Farm, Allstate, and
Farmers hold substantial shares of
the auto insurance market, it is not
uncofiunon for one of them to in-
sure mofe than one pzfty to an acci-
dent. Consequently, it is important
that the insurer in Montana may not
be subrogated against its own in-
sured. FIence, State Farm carinot pay
medical expenses under medical pay
coverage to one insured party tn an
auto accident and then subrogate
against their own insured tortfeasor.
I¡ Home Ins. Co. u. Pìnski Bros., Inc.,"
the court did not allow Home, which
had paid z large loss to Montana
Deaconess Hospital at Great Falls,
to subroga.te against the architects
blamed for the
hospital's loss,
since they were
also insured by
Flome. In Coruti-
nenta/ Irus. Co. u.
Bofiomþ,3o the
courtblocked sub-
rogation against
the insured's brother who was
blamed for burning down the in-
sured's cabin where he was a guest.
The court did so on the ground that
the guest is in the same shoes as the
insured. Finally, the insurer may not
recover from at additional insured
in subroga.tion.3l
The Hospital Lien Problem
r\ related problem for counsel
who recovers insurance proceeds on
behalf of the injured tot victim and
seeks to protect that victim is the
hospital or other medical lien
claimant which asserts full lien rights
to the recovered fund with no inten-
tion of sharing the burden of the
victim's expenses from attomey fees
and litigation costs. Technically, the
medical provider is not subrogated
to the injured patient's rþhts and
can ãrgùe that it is not bound by the
rule of Skauge and Detienne that the
patient must be made whole before
the lienor can be satisfied. FIowever,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in
Caardianthþ and Conseraanrshþ of
Bloonquist,"' applied the cornmon
fund doctrine, a principle normally
applied to situations involvng sub-
roga.tion interests, to the intetest of a
medical lienholder. The court noted
that the basis of the common fund
Flence, State Farm cennot pay medical expenses under
medical pay coverâge to one insured party in an auto accident
and then subrogate against their own insured tortfeasor.
ilIil
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doctrine is "the equitable concept
that an attomey who performs ser-
vices in creating a fund should in
equity and good conscience be al-
lowed compensation out of the
whole frmd from all those who seek
to benefit from it."33 The court ob-
served that the hospital lien on a
personal injury claim is worthless
"unless and until through the expen-
diture of funds and effort by the
attorney the
clarm is success-
fi,rlly asseted to
,,34comprerlon.
The court held
that the lien-
holding hospital
had to pay its
proportionate
share of the patient's contingent
plaintiffs attomey fee and litigation
costs.
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico also applied the common
fund doctrine to a hospital lien-
holder who refused to reduce its
statutory lien to accommodate the
contingent attomey fees and costs
incurued by the patient.uu There, the
cout held that the hospital's lien
must be reduced by its proportion-
ate share of attomey fees and costs
and thzt the net recovery to the
hospital after attomey fees and costs
satiifred the lien in its entitety.36
fn cases where liability is reasonably clear, the iniured
claimant's medical bills can be submitted to the insurer
for the third party tortfeasor with demand for payment.
in the 1994 case of Barrues u. Indepen-
dent Auto. Dealers Assh of California
Health and Welføre neiefit Þloo,o'
adopted the "Make-Whole" rule
stating, "absent an agreement to the
contrary, an insurance company may
not enforce a right to subroga.tion
until the insured has been fi.rlly com-
pensated for her injuries, that is, has
been made whole."a2 The court
found the rule to be consistent with
the principle of preventrng unjust
enrichment but did not indicate
whether attomey fees and costs were
included in making the insured
whole.
Ironically, in the Montana
Federal District Court, Judge Molloy
decided Marqah u. Irunuorker¡ Inter-
rz¿ountain Heøltlt and ll/elfare Trast
Fund,ou which involved an ERISA
plan that expressly blocked the
"Make-Whole" doctrine. The plan
provided that "[t]he Fund shall be
entitled, up to the amount of bene-
fits paid hereunder in connection
with such illness or injury, to the
proceeds of any settlement or judg-
ment that results in a recovery from
the third party, whether or not the
Participant is made whole by such
recovery Marquis was
quadrþlegic from his accident, and
his tort damages aga.inst primary
tortfeasor, Lewis and Clark Counç
were limited trnder Montana law to
$750,000. Marquis sought to allocate
his $800,000 setdement ($750,000
from the county and $50,000 ftom
the state) between his claim and his
wife's claim for loss of consortium
and to make no claim or settlement
for the benefits he received from the
Ironworkers' ERISÁ. plan. In that
manner, he hoped to avoid subroga-
tion. Because the language of the
plan voided the Make-Whole nrle
and BRtSr\ preernption, the federal
couft hâd to allow the subrogation
against that part of the settlement
allocated to the quadriplegic Mar-
quis. However, Judge Molloy then
applied the common fund doctrine
in ordering the plan to pay its pro-
potionate share of the attomey fees
and litigation costs incurred by Mar-
quis. Neverthe-
less, in a clear il-
lustration of
ERlS,A.'s preemp-
tion of state court
protections, Mar-
quis ultimately
had to reimburse
the plan
ff3l7,073.93 from his alrcady inade-
quate $800,000 settlement for his
catastrophic irjrry.
Securing Medical Payments from
Third Party Liability Coverage
In cases where liability is rea-
sonably clear, the injured claimant's
medical bills can be submitted to the
insurer for the third party tortfeasor
with demand fot payment. Until
1997, it u/as corrìrnon practice in the
insurance industry to accept the bills
for payment but refuse to pay them
until the claimant agreed to a firnJ
sefflement under the liability cover-
age. In 1997, the Supreme Court
decided, n Ndlty u. Guarantee Nat'l
Inr. Co.,as that, -.rrrder the Montana
Unfair Trade Practices Act * the
insurer has an obligation to pay
medical expenses as incurred by an
injured third-party tort victim when
the liability of its insured is reason,
ably clear. The decision was based
on two subsections of the act which
provide that the insurer may not:
(6) neglect to attempt ìn good
faith to effectuate prompt, fùr, and
equitable settlements of claims in
which liability has become reasor-
ably clear;
(13) fail to promptly settle
claims, if liability has become rea-
The ERISA Problem
Unforh¡nately, the Employee
Retirement fncome Security Act of
Ig74,t7 known as ERISA, preempts
employers' self-frmded health care
plans from state lav/ regulating in-
surance.'o Under ERISA, the United
States Supreme Court has read the
"deemer" clause of the act to ex-
empt the self-funded ERIS,\ plans
from state laws that'"regulate insur-
arrce."un In the case of such plans,
state coÍÍnon law is also pre-
empted.no Thus, Montana case law
controlling the insurer's right to sub-
rogation will not apply. However,
the Ninth Circuit Cout of 
'\ppeals,
mtiln
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sonably clear, under one portion of
the insurance policy coverage in or-
der to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance pol-
icycoverage...
The court found that refusing
to promptly pay one type of damage,
i.e., medical expense, in an effort to
force settlement of other damages
such as lost wages, pain and suffer-
ing or disability was a form of lever-
agingwhich violated MCA S 33-18-
201 (1,3) above.
The only viable
way the insurer
can avoid paying
medical bills as
incurred is to as-
seft that the bills
afe not reason-
ably causally re-
lated to accident they insure.
The court in Ndlel left open
the issue of whom the insurer pays
when it makes advance payment of
medical expense. Does the tofifea-
sor's insurer pay advance medical
expenses directly to the injured
plaintiffs medical providers or by
check made out to the plaintiffl
In Shilhøruek u. D-2 Tracking, Inc.,o7
because plaintiffs' medical ex-
penses had been paid by plaintiffs'
own insurance sources, the defen-
dant's insurer refused to pay them
ditectly to the plaintiffs and in-
stead deposited the money repre-
senting past medical expenses into
court. After the verdict, the defen-
dant's insurer asked the court, put-
suant to the collateral source re-
duction statutes, MCA, SS 27-1-
307 and 308, to grant it an offset
against the judgment fot the
amount of medical expense money
on deposit. The district court re-
fused, and the Montana Supreme
Cout affirmed finding that the
action of the insurer in depositing
the funds simply did not constitute
a. paymeît made to the plaintiffs.
The insurer could have obtained
the offset, if it had paid the medi-
cal expenses directly to providers
or paid to the plaintiffs.
Søcking Medical Pay Coverage
In 1997, the legislature pur-
ported to end all stacking of insur-
ance policy covetages when it
amended the "anti-stacking"
starute, MCA S 33-23-203.4'While
the statute's exptessed legislative
intent was to block all stacking,
and its language appears to do so,
it appears to be under challenge in
a couple of coutts in Montana at
this time. Prior to the 1997 amend-
Techniques for avoiding the insurers
subrogation, offsets and limitations are
tools of claimant's lawyers' trade...
ments, the court in Holeman held
that the statute did not apply to
medical ply covenge, which was
deemed an optional coverage. The
amended statute's effective date was
May 2,1997, and it applied to poli-
cies entered into from May 3, 1997
on. Consequently, for policies in ef-
fect as late ¿s i|iffay 2, 1-998, one may
still be able to stack medicù puy
coverage for pulposes of securing
payment of medical expenses that
would exhaust a single coverage.
Conclusion
The ever-rising costs of medi-
cal treatrnent dictate that plaintiffs
counsel is often faced with a client
who has incurred massive medical
expenses 'rn a rrntter of weeks. In-
surers are ever vigilant in an effort to
contain their own liability for medi-
cal expense under their policy
promises. Plaintiffs counsel must
analyze the situation in light of
statutes and case law to determine
the right tacacal moves and timing
in making claims to secure payment
of medical expenses. Techniques for
avoiding the insurers subroga.tion,
offsets and limitations are tools of
claimant's lawyers' trade, and coun-
sel must be aware of them and share
them.
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